Chevron’s Ambiguity Hurdle: Delgado v. Holder and 
the Proper Interpretation of the Particularly Serious 
Crime Exception to Deportation Relief by Hains, William M.
BYU Law Review
Volume 2010 | Issue 1 Article 7
3-1-2010
Chevron’s Ambiguity Hurdle: Delgado v. Holder
and the Proper Interpretation of the Particularly
Serious Crime Exception to Deportation Relief
William M. Hains
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Immigration Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted
for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
William M. Hains, Chevron’s Ambiguity Hurdle: Delgado v. Holder and the Proper Interpretation of the Particularly Serious Crime Exception
to Deportation Relief, 2010 BYU L. Rev. 81 (2010).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol2010/iss1/7
DO NOT DELETE 3/6/2010 2:17 PM 
 
81 
Chevron’s Ambiguity Hurdle: Delgado v. Holder and 
the Proper Interpretation of the Particularly Serious 
Crime Exception to Deportation Relief 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Immigration policy involves interplay between the interests of 
society and those of the individual immigrant. Public rhetoric during 
the 2006 U.S. immigration reform debates illustrates this interplay: 
Proponents of liberal reform seem to focus on the impact of 
deportation on individuals and families, while proponents of 
restrictive reform emphasize the necessity of securing society against 
immigrants involved in criminal activity, or even terrorism.1 Official 
policy often reflects these competing interests as well, but unlike 
public debate, it must attempt to do so with a unified voice. 
Recognizing the security concerns of society, Congress has 
established certain deportation grounds as a basis for removal of 
aliens2 who previously have been admitted to the United States.3 Yet 
Congress has also provided for a number of special forms of relief 
from deportation, including asylum and withholding of removal. 
This relief allows otherwise deportable aliens to avoid removal by 
showing that upon returning to their home country they may be 
persecuted because of race, religion, nationality, membership in a 
 
 1. See generally, e.g., Sonia Nazario, Man Fights Deportation by Invoking His Former 
Gang Ties, L.A. TIMES, June 3, 2007, at B1; Jay Root, Officials Testify of Crisis at the Border, 
FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM (Tex.), Aug. 17, 2006, at State and Regional News Section; 
Rubén Rosario, ‘I Want to Go with You,’ SAINT PAUL PIONEER PRESS (Minn.), July 24, 2006, 
at A1.  
 2. This Note will use the term “alien” as it is defined by the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (INA): “any person not a citizen or national of the United States.” INA § 
101(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (2006). The INA was passed in 1952 and has since been 
amended several times.  Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163, available as amended at 
http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.f6da51a2342135be7e9d7a10e0dc91a0/?
vgnextoid=fa7e539dc4bed010VgnVCM1000000ecd190aRCRD&vgnextchannel=fa7e539dc4
bed010VgnVCM1000000ecd190aRCRD&CH=act. Immigration law scholarship often refers 
to the INA, as amended, rather than to the statute as codified in Title 8 of the United States 
Code. See THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: 
PROCESS AND POLICY xiii (6th ed. 2008). Because the courts typically refer to the Code, this 
Note will provide citations to both, though it will refer solely to INA sections in the body of 
the Note. 
 3. See INA § 237(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2006) (classes of deportable aliens).  
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particular social group, or political opinion.4 Further illustrating the 
interplay of interests, Congress has stipulated that this relief is not 
available to any alien who has been convicted of a “particularly 
serious crime” and is thus a danger to the community.5 Despite these 
attempts by Congress to balance the competing interests of the 
individual and the community in a consistent way, federal courts of 
appeal are split in their interpretation of what constitutes a 
particularly serious crime under the withholding of removal statute. 
In Delgado v. Holder,6 the Ninth Circuit addressed the 
particularly serious crime exception to asylum and withholding. In so 
doing, the court misconstrued the asylum provision by holding that 
the Attorney General, or one acting under his authority, could 
designate crimes as particularly serious on a case-by-case basis, rather 
than solely through the rule-making process. Yet this 
misconstruction is consistent with the only other circuit to have 
addressed the issue. Regarding withholding, the dissent provided a 
compelling analysis that the statute, correctly interpreted, requires 
particularly serious crimes to be aggravated felonies. The dissent’s 
analysis, however, is rooted in a subtle but significant misapplication 
of the Chevron doctrine. Correctly applying the Chevron doctrine, 
the majority examined the reasonableness, rather than the 
correctness, of the executive agency’s interpretation of the statute 
and deferred to the agency’s interpretation that particularly serious 
crimes need not be aggravated felonies under the withholding 
provision. Delgado illustrates that the proper application of the 
Chevron doctrine requires an initial inquiry into whether a statute is 
ambiguous; if followed, this approach may resolve the circuit split 
 
 4. See INA § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006) (incorporating the above-
mentioned five protected groups into the definition of “refugee”); INA § 208(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1158(b)(1) (2006) (stipulating that an asylee must first qualify as a refugee); INA § 
241(b)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (setting forth requirements for withholding). There 
are significant differences between eligibility for asylum and withholding, including the 
requisite level of threat posed to the alien to qualify for relief. These differences are discussed 
briefly below in Part III. 
 5. INA § 208(b)(2)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii) (asylum); INA § 241(b)(3) 
(B)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (b)(3)(B)(ii) (withholding). See Marisa Silenzi Cianciarulo, Terrorism 
and Asylum Seekers: Why the Real ID Act Is a False Promise, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 101, 110 
(2006) (“Over the next twenty-five years [after the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980], 
asylum would emerge as a unique, complex body of law and a lightning rod for the national 
immigration debate, forcing the country to balance traditional humanitarian interests against 
weighty national security concerns.”). 
 6. 563 F.3d 863 (9th Cir. 2009). 
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and lead to a more consistent application of the deportation relief 
scheme enacted by Congress. 
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Hernan Ismael Delgado, a native citizen of El Salvador, entered 
the United States in 1980 on a ninety-day non-immigrant visitor 
visa.7 Delgado was ten years old at the time.8 According to Delgado, 
his grandmother brought him and his sister to the United States 
after their mother and step-father had been tortured and killed by 
government death squads and threats had been made against the 
remaining family members.9 Delgado overstayed his ninety-day visa; 
when he was twenty-two he petitioned for asylum, but the petition 
went unanswered.10  
In 2001, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) 
initiated removal proceedings against Delgado for overstaying his 
visa.11 Among the various forms of relief available to aliens about to 
be deported, Delgado sought asylum, withholding of removal, 
Convention Against Torture (CAT) withholding, and CAT 
deferral.12 While each of these forms of relief is distinct, they are all 
based upon the risk of persecution an alien faces if sent to a particular 
country upon removal. The Immigration Judge determined that 
Delgado’s three felony DUIs, one of which had led to serious bodily 
injury, constituted particularly serious crimes.13 Therefore, Delgado 
was statutorily ineligible for asylum, withholding of removal, and 
 
 7. Id. at 866; Appellant’s Opening Brief at 5–6 (June 6, 2004), Delgado, 563 F.3d 863 
(No. 03-74442). 
 8. Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 7, at 6. 
 9. Id. at 6, 15–18. 
 10. Id. at 8. 
 11. Brief for Respondent at 4–5, Delgado, 563 F.3d 863 (No. 03-74442). The INS also 
asserted that Delgado was deportable because one of his previous DUI convictions constituted 
an aggravated felony. During the deportation proceedings, however, the INS dropped this 
charge. Id. 
 12. Delgado, 563 F.3d at 866. Apart from withholding of removal provided under INA 
§ 241(b)(3), CAT provides independent grounds for relief by withholding or deferring 
removal. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(4) (2008). An alien is only eligible for relief under CAT if the 
Immigration Judge “determines that the alien is more likely than not to be tortured” upon 
deportation to a particular country. Id. 
 13. Delgado, 563 F.3d at 866; id. at 876 (Berzon, J., concurring in part, dissenting in 
part). 
DO NOT DELETE 3/6/2010 2:17 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2010 
84 
CAT withholding.14 The Immigration Judge also determined that 
Delgado was ineligible for CAT deferral because he had not proven 
that it was more likely than not that he would be tortured if returned 
to El Salvador.15 The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed 
the decision and issued an unpublished per curiam decision signed 
by one member.16 
III. SIGNIFICANT LEGAL BACKGROUND 
At issue in this case is the scope of the Attorney General’s 
authority to limit two forms of relief for aliens subject to deportation 
or removal: asylum and withholding of removal. While the basis for 
relief (persecution) and the immediate result (no deportation) are 
the same for both asylum and withholding, there are a number of 
important differences between the two forms of relief. Asylum grants 
a refugee legal status as an asylee and provides for a number of 
benefits, including a formal mechanism for adjusting his or her status 
to that of a legal permanent resident.17 On the other hand, 
withholding grants no official status upon an alien and provides no 
formal mechanism for adjustment of status; rather, it is simply an 
agreement by the government not to deport the alien.18 The two 
forms of relief require differing levels of proof that persecution will 
occur: while a “well-founded fear” is sufficient for asylum, the alien 
must prove that persecution is “more likely than not” for 
withholding.19 Despite these differences, withholding is desirable for 
the alien because the government must grant this relief to any alien 
who qualifies, whereas the government has discretion whether to 
grant a qualifying refugee’s asylum claim.20 Under both asylum and 
 
 14. Id. at 866 (majority opinion). Aliens otherwise eligible for one of these forms of 
relief are disqualified if they have been convicted of a particularly serious crime. See infra Part 
III. While separate INA provisions govern the particularly serious crime exception for asylum 
and withholding relief, regulations incorporate the INA withholding provision in determining 
whether an alien is eligible for CAT withholding. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(d)(2) (2008). 
 15. Delgado, 563 F.3d at 866. 
 16. Id. 
 17. ALEINIKOFF, supra note 2, at 847–49. Asylum is governed by INA §§ 208–09, 8 
U.S.C. §§ 1158–59 (2006), while withholding is governed by INA § 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 
1231(b)(3). 
 18. ALEINIKOFF, supra note 2, at 847–49. 
 19. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 423–24 (1987). 
 20. INA § 208(b)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (2006) (asylum); INA § 241(b) 
(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) (withholding). Having a mandatory withholding provision is 
also important because it ensures compliance with the government’s international treaty 
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withholding, however, an otherwise eligible alien can be disqualified 
if found to have committed a particularly serious crime. While this 
exception applies to both forms of relief, asylum and withholding 
each have distinct provisions determining what constitutes a 
particularly serious crime. 
A. Exception to Eligibility for Asylum 
Section 208 of the INA provides that the Attorney General or 
Secretary of Homeland Security may grant asylum to an alien who 
qualifies as a refugee under § 101.21 Section 101 defines “refugee” as 
follows: 
any person . . . who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is 
unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, 
[his or her country of nationality or habitual residence] because of 
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of 
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, 
or political opinion.22 
A refugee is disqualified, however, if, among other exceptions, “the 
Attorney General determines that . . . the alien, having been 
convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, 
constitutes a danger to the community of the United States.”23 The 
statute then declares that for purposes of this exception, “an alien 
who has been convicted of an aggravated felony shall be considered 
to have been convicted of a particularly serious crime.”24 
Furthermore, “[t]he Attorney General may designate by regulation 
offenses that will be considered to be a crime described in clause (ii) 
[particularly serious crimes] . . . .”25 The exception to eligibility for 
asylum thus creates a clear designation of all aggravated felonies as 
 
obligations under Article 33 of the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. See 
ALEINIKOFF, supra note 2, at 848–49; United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267, Art. 33, reprinted in 19 U.S.T. 6223. 
 21. INA § 208(b)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (2006). 
 22. INA § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006). 
 23. INA § 208(b)(2)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2006). “The BIA has 
interpreted this exception to require only a determination of whether an alien’s crime is 
‘particularly serious’; according to the BIA, an alien convicted of a particularly serious crime 
necessarily constitutes a danger to the community.” Choeum v. INS, 129 F.3d 29, 40 (1st Cir. 
1997). 
 24. INA § 208(b)(2)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(B)(i) (2006). 
 25. INA § 208(b)(2)(B)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(B)(ii) (2006). 
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particularly serious and authorizes the Attorney General to designate 
additional crimes by regulation.26  
In Ali v. Achim,27 the Seventh Circuit classified these two 
approaches as two per se categories of particularly serious crimes—
those identified by statute and those identified by regulation—but 
refused to interpret them as the exclusive means of determining 
particularly serious crimes.28 Ali held that the Attorney General was 
allowed to determine that an alien’s crimes were particularly serious 
not only by regulation, with its formal requirements of promulgation 
and public comment, but also on a case-by-case basis.29 To hold 
otherwise, the court reasoned, would be to place an “onerous 
burden” on the Attorney General, requiring him or her to scour 
each state’s penal code and anticipate every possible particularly 
serious crime.30 
B. Exception to Eligibility for Withholding of Removal 
Withholding of removal is governed by § 241 of the INA: 
“[T]he Attorney General may not remove an alien to a country if the 
Attorney General decides that the alien’s life or freedom would be 
threatened in that country because of the alien’s race, religion, 
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political 
opinion.”31As with asylum, however, relief through withholding of 
removal is not available “if the Attorney General decides that . . . the 
alien, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly 
serious crime is a danger to the community of the United States.”32 
The statute then provides a distinct explanation of what shall be 
considered a particularly serious crime: 
 
 26. INA § 208(b)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(B) (2006). 
 27. 468 F.3d 462 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 28. Id. at 468–69. “Congress named two categories of per se ‘particularly serious’ 
crimes, but it did not say these were the only categories of crimes that would bring an alien’s 
case within the statutory bar.” Id. at 469. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. INA § 241(b)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (emphasis added). The Supreme 
Court has held that an alien must show that it is more likely than not that his or her life or 
freedom would be threatened upon deportation—a higher burden of proof than that required 
by the asylum provision’s more subjective showing of a “well-founded fear of persecution.” 
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446–50 (1987); INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 429–30 
(1984). 
 32. INA § 241(b)(3)(B)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii). 
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an alien who has been convicted of an aggravated felony (or 
felonies) for which the alien has been sentenced to an aggregate 
term of imprisonment of at least 5 years shall be considered to have 
committed a particularly serious crime. The previous sentence shall 
not preclude the Attorney General from determining that, 
notwithstanding the length of sentence imposed, an alien has been 
convicted of a particularly serious crime.33 
Thus, the per se category of particularly serious crimes is narrower 
for withholding than for asylum: only aggravated felonies resulting in 
sentencing to an aggregate of at least five years’ imprisonment. The 
question then arises: Can the Attorney General determine that any 
crime outside this per se category is particularly serious, or only 
aggravated felonies outside this per se category? 
Ali addressed the issue of withholding in addition to its ruling 
on the asylum provisions. The Seventh Circuit held that a crime need 
not be an aggravated felony to be designated as particularly serious 
by the Attorney General.34 “Congress specified that the Attorney 
General may extend the ‘particularly serious’ designation to 
aggravated felonies producing prison terms of less than five years. 
But the absence of a similar provision for nonaggravated-felony 
crimes does not imply that only aggravated felonies can qualify as 
‘particularly serious’ crimes.”35 Yet in Alaka v. Attorney General,36 
the Third Circuit interpreted the statute to mean that a particularly 
serious crime must be an aggravated felony under the withholding 
provisions.37 The court reasoned that because the second sentence in 
question “is clearly tied to the first,” the Attorney General’s 
discretion was similarly limited to the realm of the first sentence: 
aggravated felonies.38 
In 2007, the BIA issued In re N-A-M-,39 following the 
interpretation of the Seventh Circuit in Ali. As noted above, § 
241(b)(3)(B) provides a per se category of particularly serious 
crimes: aggravated felonies for which the alien is sentenced to an 
 
 33. INA § 241(b)(3)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B). 
 34. Ali v. Achim, 468 F.3d 462, 470 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 35. Id. 
 36. 456 F.3d 88 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 37. Id. at 105. 
 38. Id. at 104–05. 
 39. 24 I. & N. Dec. 336 (B.I.A. 2007). 
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aggregate term of five years’ imprisonment.40 But the following 
sentence in the statute states that particularly serious crimes are not 
limited to that per se category. The BIA declared that the second 
sentence in question “means only that aggravated felonies for which 
sentences of less than 5 years’ imprisonment were imposed may be 
found to be ‘particularly serious crimes,’ not that only aggravated 
felonies may be found to be such crimes.”41 
In support of this interpretation, the BIA pointed to “[a] plain 
reading of the Act,” its “consistent practice in numerous [non-
precedential] decisions,” and an analysis of the legislative history of 
the particularly serious crime exception.42 The BIA explained that 
with the passage of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”),43 which amended the 
definition of particularly serious crimes, “Congress intentionally 
withdrew much of its prior equation of particularly serious crimes 
with aggravated felonies in the withholding of removal context in 
order to allow a more flexible analysis in determining whether an 
offense is a particularly serious crime.”44 To hold otherwise, the BIA 
reasoned, would create a “loophole for particularly serious crimes 
that happen to escape classification as aggravated felonies”—a result 
that “would be inconsistent with the goal of protecting the 
public.”45 
After N-A-M-, the Second Circuit addressed the withholding 
issue in Nethagani v. Mukasey,46 and acknowledged that the two 
competing interpretations were both viable, but in light of the 
ambiguity, the court deferred to the BIA’s decision in N-A-M-.47 
IV. THE COURT’S DECISION 
In Delgado v. Holder, the Ninth Circuit held that the Attorney 
General could determine by adjudication as well as by regulation that 
certain crimes were particularly serious under the asylum provision 
 
 40. INA § 241(b)(3)(B)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii) (2006). 
 41. N-A-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 341 (first emphasis added). 
 42. Id. at 338–39. 
 43. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546. 
 44. N-A-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 340–41. 
 45. Id. at 341. 
 46. 532 F.3d 150 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 47. Id. at 156–57 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 
U.S. 837, 842–44 (1984)). 
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and that particularly serious crimes did not have to be aggravated 
felonies under the withholding provision.48 The court also held that 
it had jurisdiction to review the merits of the Immigration Judge’s 
decision denying asylum, but not withholding.49 Considering the 
merits of the decision denying asylum, the court found that the 
Immigration Judge had erred in determining that Delgado’s three 
DUIs were particularly serious.50 The court upheld, however, the 
determination that Delgado was not eligible for relief under CAT.51 
A. Asylum 
In its analysis of whether the Attorney General had authority to 
designate crimes as particularly serious by adjudication for purposes 
of asylum, the court sought to ascertain what authority the Attorney 
General had before the asylum provision was enacted.52 The 
Immigration Act of 1990 introduced the aggravated felony 
designation of a category of per se particularly serious crimes.53 
 
 48. Delgado v. Holder, 563 F.3d 863, 865 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 49. Id. Delgado’s case was previously decided by the Ninth Circuit under the name of 
Delgado v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 1017 (9th Cir. 2008). Delgado petitioned for and was granted a 
rehearing, the result of which is the present case that supplies the subject matter for this Note. 
In Delgado v. Mukasey, the court reached the opposite jurisdictional holding regarding asylum, 
finding that it could not review the merits of whether the Immigration Judge correctly held 
that Delgado’s three DUIs constituted particularly serious crimes. Id. at 1023–25. Unlike the 
present case, Delgado v. Mukasey did not address the jurisdictional issue concerning 
withholding. A circuit split exists as to whether a jurisdiction-stripping statute in § 242(a) 
(2)(B) divests the courts of authorization to review the merits of an agency’s determination 
that aliens are ineligible for withholding because their convictions constituted particularly 
serious crimes. Ali held that the jurisdiction-stripping statute applied, while Alaka and 
Nethagani held that it did not apply to withholding. Nethagani, 532 F.3d at 154–55; Ali v. 
Achim, 468 F.3d 462, 465 (7th Cir. 2006); Alaka v. Att’y Gen., 456 F.3d 88, 94–101 (3d 
Cir. 2006). In Delgado v. Holder, the court stated that it was bound by prior precedent, 
namely Matsuk v. INS, 247 F.3d 999, 1002 (9th Cir. 2001), which found that the court had 
no jurisdiction to review the merits of withholding decisions. Judge Berzon’s dissent criticized 
the reasoning of Matsuk but concurred in the majority’s holding that it controlled the issue of 
jurisdiction. Delgado, 563 F.3d at 887–89 (Berzon, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
The majority acknowledged, however, that “Judge Berzon’s concurring and dissenting opinion 
here offers trenchant and, to us, persuasive criticisms of this ruling of Matsuk. As her opinion 
recognizes, however, we are bound as a three-judge panel to follow Matsuk.” Id. at 871 n.12 
(majority opinion). 
 50. Delgado, 563 F.3d at 865.  
 51. Id. at 865–66. This Note focuses on the court’s analysis of the particularly serious 
crime exception to withholding and asylum and will not address further the court’s limited 
examination of Delgado’s CAT claims. 
 52. Id. at 870. 
 53. Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978. 
DO NOT DELETE 3/6/2010 2:17 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2010 
90 
Previously, the Attorney General determined which crimes were 
particularly serious on a case-by-case basis, using the factors set forth 
in Matter of Frentescu.54 Thus, the court reasoned that the purpose 
of the 1990 amendment was “only to ensure that certain crimes 
(aggravated felonies) would be categorically determined to be 
‘particularly serious,’ regardless of the circumstances of their 
commission,” and that the Attorney General would be given 
additional authority to categorically designate crimes as particularly 
serious by regulation.55 “The provision simply does not speak to the 
ability of the Attorney General to determine in an individual case 
that the circumstances of an alien’s commission of a crime made that 
crime particularly serious . . . .”56 
B. Withholding of Removal 
The court acknowledged the circuit split regarding whether a 
particularly serious crime had to be an aggravated felony under the 
withholding provision, but it noted that the BIA had issued a 
precedential decision after Ali and Alaka had been decided.57 
Acknowledging the Chevron deference owed to the BIA’s decision, 
the court thus examined N-A-M- to determine if the BIA’s decision 
was reasonable.58 The court first noted that the statute did not 
“expressly require” the Attorney General to limit designations of 
particularly serious crimes to aggravated felonies.59 Then, the court 
examined the legislative history as set forth in N-A-M- and found 
that  
nothing in the legislative history indicates that Congress intended, 
by creating a categorical bar and by later relaxing that categorical 
bar, to eliminate the Attorney General’s pre-existing discretion [in 
applying the Frentescu factors] to determine that, under the 
circumstances presented by an individual case, a crime was 
 
 54. 18 I. & N. Dec. 244, 247 (B.I.A. 1982) (“[T]he record in most proceedings will 
have to be analyzed on a case-by-case basis. In judging the seriousness of a crime, we look to 
such factors as the nature of the conviction, the circumstances and underlying facts of the 
conviction, the type of sentence imposed, and, most importantly, whether the type and 
circumstances of the crime indicate that the alien will be a danger to the community.”). 
 55. Delgado, 563 F.3d at 870. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 867. 
 58. Id. at 868. 
 59. Id. 
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“particularly serious,” whether or not the crime was an aggravated 
felony. We therefore find the BIA’s interpretation of the statute 
reasonable . . . .60  
C. Dissent 
In her dissent, Judge Berzon challenged the majority’s 
interpretation of both the asylum and withholding provisions. 
1. Asylum 
Looking at the language of the asylum provision and applying 
common canons of statutory construction, Judge Berzon concluded 
that the Attorney General is authorized to designate non-aggravated 
felonies as particularly serious crimes only by regulation.61 According 
to Judge Berzon, the plain language of the statute authorizes the 
Attorney General to issue regulations.62 The majority’s conclusion 
that the authority is also retained to make such determinations 
through case-by-case adjudication is an “implication from silence.”63 
Moreover, the INA already provided a general power to establish 
regulations under the Act; thus, the language in the asylum provision 
would be superfluous if, rather than being read to designate the 
exclusive mode of determining particularly serious crimes, it was read 
to grant additional rule-making authority.64 Furthermore, the Ninth 
Circuit has read similar language in other statutes as requiring 
regulations in place of case-by-case adjudication.65  
In contrast, the withholding provision is silent as to the Attorney 
General’s methodology in designating particularly serious crimes. In 
such scenarios, Judge Berzon continued, “‘agencies are free to 
choose . . . between rule making and adjudication.’”66 Differences in 
structure also suggest that case-by-case determinations of eligibility 
for asylum are unnecessary because individualized decisions will 
ultimately be made in the granting of asylum. On the other hand, 
case-by-case determinations, if they are ever to be made for 
 
 60. Id. at 869. 
 61. Id. at 887 (Berzon, J., dissenting). 
 62. Id. at 886. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. (citing Davis v. EPA, 348 F.3d 772, 785 (9th Cir. 2003)). 
 66. Id. (quoting Davis, 348 F.3d at 785). 
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withholding, must be made at the eligibility stage because of the 
mandatory nature of withholding.67  
2. Withholding of removal 
Regarding withholding, Judge Berzon again turned to canons of 
construction, criticizing the majority’s analysis in several points and 
ultimately concluding that particularly serious crimes must be 
aggravated felonies under the withholding provisions.68 First, the 
majority’s broad interpretation of the statute renders superfluous the 
limiting phrase of the second sentence: “notwithstanding the length 
of sentence imposed.”69 Second, the withholding provision expressly 
refers to aggravated felonies; silence as to non-aggravated felonies 
suggests that Congress did not intend for them to be considered 
particularly serious crimes.70 Third, the majority interpreted the 
Attorney General’s authority in both asylum and withholding 
provisions as “identically broad” despite several differences in the 
scope of the two forms of relief.71 Finally, the majority’s 
interpretation rendered the statute “hopelessly internally 
inconsistent” with section 241(b)(3)(B)(iii), which states that aliens 
who have committed a “serious nonpolitical crime” before entering 
the United States are also ineligible for withholding.72 Serious 
nonpolitical crimes “typically fall well within the current definition of 
aggravated felony,” yet the BIA has interpreted such crimes as less 
serious than particularly serious crimes.73 
Judge Berzon also challenged the majority’s interpretation of the 
legislative history. The origin of the particularly serious crime 
exception was the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of 
 
 67. Id. at 886–87. 
 68. Id. at 880–83. 
 69. Id. at 881 (“We simply don’t read statutes as throwing around loose, meaningless 
language for no discernible reason.”) (citing United States v. Novak, 476 F.3d 1041, 1048 
(9th Cir. 2007)). This canon is commonly known as the rule against surplusage. 
 70. Id. (“[T]he inclusion of one item ordinarily excludes similar items that could have 
been, but were not, mentioned.”) (citing Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149, 168 
(2003)). This canon is commonly known as expressio unius. 
 71. Id. at 882 (“[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a 
statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress 
acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” (quoting Tang v. 
Reno, 77 F.3d 1194, 1197 (9th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted))). 
 72. Id. (citing Padash v. INS, 358 F.3d 1161, 1170–71 (9th Cir. 2004)). 
 73. Id. (citing In re Frentescu, 18 I. & N. Dec. 244, 247 (B.I.A. 1982)). 
DO NOT DELETE 3/6/2010 2:17 PM 
81 Chevron’s Ambiguity Hurdle 
 93 
Refugees74 (“Convention”) and the 1967 U.N. Protocol relating to 
the Status of Refugees75 (“Protocol”).76 Changes to the particularly 
serious crime provisions, the dissent argued, should thus be read as 
attempts to bring U.S. law into compliance with its obligations 
under the Convention and Protocol, which required the withholding 
of removal for aliens whose life or liberty was threatened upon 
removal to a particular country.77 As Congress expanded the 
statutory definition of aggravated felonies under the INA, it relaxed a 
previously categorical definition of all aggravated felonies as 
particularly serious crimes for purposes of withholding.78 Otherwise, 
the law could have led to the violation of the Convention and 
Protocol by disqualifying aliens for withholding because of “fairly 
minor offenses.”79 
Thus, applying traditional canons of construction to interpret the 
text, structure, legislative history, and purpose of the asylum and 
withholding provisions, Judge Berzon concluded that the Attorney 
General could determine only by regulation that non-aggravated 
felonies were particularly serious crimes for purposes of asylum, and 
the Attorney General could designate only aggravated felonies as 
particularly serious crimes for purposes of withholding.  
V. ANALYSIS 
While the dissent presented the more compelling interpretation 
of the asylum and withholding provisions, it misapplied the Chevron 
doctrine with regard to withholding. The majority appropriately 
concluded that the withholding statute is ambiguous and accordingly 
 
 74. United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 
U.N.T.S. 150, available at http://www.unhcr.org/protect/protection/3b66c2aa10. pdf. 
 75. United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 606 
U.N.T.S. 267, reprinted in 19 U.S.T. 6223. 
 76. Delgado, 563 F.3d at 883. The exception was added to the INA by the Refugee Act 
of 1980. Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 200, 94 Stat. 102 (1980). 
 77. Delgado, 563 F.3d at 883–85; see also INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436–
37 (1987) (“If one thing is clear from the legislative history of the new definition of ‘refugee,’ 
and indeed the entire 1980 [Refugee] Act, it is that one of Congress’ primary purposes was to 
bring United States refugee law into conformance with the 1967 [Protocol], to which the 
United States acceded in 1968.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 78. Delgado, 563 F.3d at 883–85. 
 79. Id. at 884 (quoting Sen. Kennedy, Mark-up on S. 1664 Before the Senate Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 60–61 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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limited its analysis to the reasonableness, rather than the correctness, 
of the BIA’s interpretation. 
A. Divining the Meaning of a Particularly Serious Exception 
Judge Berzon’s dissent offers a convincing analysis of the 
meaning of the asylum and withholding provisions in the INA. 
Regarding asylum, the statute clearly specifies the Attorney General’s 
authority to designate by regulation while remaining silent as to 
authority to adjudicate. Comparison with the withholding 
provisions, which are silent as to the Attorney General’s method of 
designation, suggests that Congress intended the reference to rule-
making authority to designate the exclusive method of determining 
particularly serious crimes for asylum. The majority emphasizes the 
impracticability of requiring the Attorney General to designate 
particularly serious crimes only by regulation; yet, this possibly 
inconvenient policy does not override the plain meaning and 
structure of the statute. As the Seventh Circuit noted in the context 
of another immigration provision, “any unease with the policy 
implications of the statute in question are matters within the 
province of Congress and not the judicial branch.”80 Congress has 
clearly spoken on the method by which the Attorney General may 
decide which non-aggravated felonies are particularly serious crimes 
for purposes of asylum. The majority in Delgado, therefore, 
incorrectly held that the Attorney General can determine through 
case-by-case adjudication that non-aggravated felonies constitute 
particularly serious crimes. As the court notes, however, Delgado’s 
challenge on this issue is now moot given the court’s reversal on the 
merits of the Immigration Judge’s determination that his crimes 
were particularly serious for purposes of asylum.81 
Concerning withholding, the text of the statute strongly suggests 
that particularly serious crimes must be aggravated felonies. Again, 
the text states that 
an alien who has been convicted of an aggravated felony (or 
felonies) for which the alien has been sentenced to an aggregate 
term of imprisonment of at least 5 years shall be considered to have 
committed a particularly serious crime. The previous sentence shall 
not preclude the Attorney General from determining that, 
 
 80. Guerrero-Perez v. INS, 242 F.3d 727, 737 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 81. Delgado, 563 F.3d at 865 (majority opinion). 
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notwithstanding the length of sentence imposed, an alien has been 
convicted of a particularly serious crime.82 
The second sentence operates within the realm of the first as a 
modification of a per se category: the Attorney General is authorized 
to designate additional crimes as particularly serious, but the first 
sentence is only modified in terms of “the length of sentence 
imposed,” not whether the crime is an aggravated felony. This 
interpretation is solidified by the canons of construction applied by 
Judge Berzon in analyzing the text, structure, legislative history, and 
purpose of the particularly serious crime exemption. 
B. Clearly Ambiguous 
The majority noted that its decision regarding withholding was 
controlled by the Chevron doctrine.83 The Chevron doctrine requires 
courts to defer to an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute 
that generally has been entrusted to that agency to administer.84 
Chevron thus directs courts to determine first “whether Congress has 
directly spoken to the precise question at issue.”85 If Congress has 
clearly spoken, “that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as 
the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent 
of Congress.”86 “[I]f the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect 
to the specific issue,” the court must determine whether the agency’s 
interpretation is reasonable and, if so, defer to that interpretation.87 
There is disagreement as to whether the withholding provision at 
issue in Delgado clearly expresses the intent of Congress. Judge 
Berzon simply declared that her interpretation of the withholding 
provision was commanded by “a plain reading of the text.”88 Alaka 
also stated that its result was dictated by the “plain language and 
structure (i.e., context) of the statute.”89 Even N-A-M- stated that its 
decision rested, in part, upon “[a] plain reading of the Act.”90 Ali 
 
 82. INA § 241(b)(3)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B) (2006). 
 83. Delgado, 563 F.3d at 867. 
 84. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–45 
(1984). 
 85. Id. at 842. 
 86. Id. at 842–43. 
 87. Id. at 843. 
 88. Delgado, 563 F.3d at 880 (Berzon, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
 89. Alaka v. Att’y Gen., 456 F.3d 88, 104 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 90. In re N-A-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 336, 338 (B.I.A. 2007). 
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implied a plain and unambiguous statute, yet it also stated that the 
BIA’s decision then under review was reasonable should the statute 
be deemed ambiguous.91 After N-A-M- was decided, however, 
Nethagani acknowledged that “[w]e cannot find that [§ 
241(b)(3)(B)] . . . speaks clearly to the question raised in this 
petition because its second sentence admits of at least two 
readings . . . .”92 Nethagani also challenged Alaka’s designation of 
the statute as plain because it “had no occasion to consider whether 
the statute was ambiguous because there was not yet a BIA opinion 
on point.”93 Reflecting the divergence among the circuits as to the 
clarity of the statute, the majority in Delgado could not seem to 
decide; it declared simply that the “plain text” of the statute 
“naturally” raises two alternative interpretations.94 Given the 
majority’s subsequent application of N-A-M-, this statement must be 
read as a finding of ambiguity. 
While Judge Berzon’s interpretation of the withholding 
provision is more convincing than that of the majority in Delgado, 
the provision is susceptible to competing interpretations. The 
grammatical and statutory structure favors Berzon’s interpretation, 
yet, as the majority notes, the statute does not expressly state that 
the Attorney General is limited to aggravated felonies in determining 
particularly serious crimes; therefore, the statute raises two plausible 
interpretations.95 
C. Statutory Interpretation under the Chevron Doctrine 
There is a tension inherent in the Chevron doctrine: To what 
extent may canons of construction be employed by the court to 
determine the clear intent of Congress? Chevron states that “[i]f a 
court, employing traditional tools of statutory construction, 
ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise question at 
 
 91. See Ali v. Achim, 468 F.3d 462, 470 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 92. Nethagani v. Mukasey, 532 F.3d 150, 156 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Delgado v. Holder, 563 F.3d 863, 867 (9th Cir. 2009) (“The question that 
naturally arises from this plain text is whether the last sentence is meant to limit the Attorney 
General to the universe of aggravated felonies described in the preceding sentence or, 
conversely, whether the last sentence simply preserves the Attorney General’s authority to 
determine a crime to be particularly serious regardless of the penalty or its designation or non-
designation as an aggravated felony.”). 
 95. Id. at 868. 
DO NOT DELETE 3/6/2010 2:17 PM 
81 Chevron’s Ambiguity Hurdle 
 97 
issue, that intention is the law and must be given effect.”96 Yet the 
Court declared that when legislative intent is ambiguous, “a court 
may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a 
reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency.”97 
When reviewing an agency interpretation of a statute, there is a fine 
distinction between appropriate and inappropriate application of 
canons of construction. 
Justice Scalia’s concurrence in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca 
highlighted this tension. Scalia chided the majority for its “excessive” 
foray into the legislative history after having determined that the 
plain text and structure clearly demonstrated a particular meaning.98 
Chevron only condoned turning to legislative history, Scalia 
explained, if the statute had been found to be silent or ambiguous, 
and then only to confirm a decision that the agency’s interpretation 
had been reasonable.99 Scalia criticized the majority for implying 
“that courts may substitute their interpretation of a statute for that 
of an agency whenever, ‘[e]mploying traditional tools of statutory 
construction,’ they are able to reach a conclusion as to the proper 
interpretation of the statute.”100 Such an approach, Scalia said, was 
an “unjustifiable” misreading of Chevron.101 
The proper use of tools of statutory construction in the Chevron 
context, then, is to determine, first, whether congressional intent 
clearly and unambiguously speaks to the issue.102 In other words, the 
court should use canons of construction to determine as a threshold 
matter whether the statute is susceptible to competing 
interpretations—not which interpretation is correct. If the statute is 
susceptible to only one interpretation, “that is the end of the 
matter,” and the court and agency are controlled by that plain 
 
 96. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 
(1984). 
 97. Id. at 844. “If . . . the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the 
precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute 
. . . .” Id. at 843. 
 98. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452–53 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 99. Id.; see also Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845 (citing United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 
382, 383 (1961)); Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 233 (1986). 
 100. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 454 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting majority 
opinion). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44. 
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meaning.103 If the statute is ambiguous—that is, reasonably 
susceptible to more than one interpretation—the canons of 
construction should not be used to determine whether a particular 
interpretation is correct, but whether the agency’s interpretation is 
reasonable and thus entitled to deference. Only then should 
legislative history be used to verify a reasonable interpretation.104 
While it may seem like an interpretive nicety, it is critical for the 
court to approach the issue through the prism of determining clarity 
rather than correctness. This approach ensures that a court does not 
inappropriately “substitute its own construction of a statutory 
provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator 
of an agency.”105 
The dissent in Delgado reached the correct interpretation of the 
asylum provisions, judging that the express language of the statute 
dictated the precise methods available for the Attorney General to 
designate non-aggravated felonies as particularly serious crimes. The 
dissent’s extensive analysis of the withholding provisions also 
presented the more convincing interpretation of the meaning of the 
statute, yet such an analysis was irrelevant. Given a proper 
understanding of the Chevron doctrine, the question of whether the 
BIA was correct in its interpretation of the statute is beside the point. 
The dissent got the threshold issue wrong, determining that the 
statute is clear when, in fact, it is ambiguous. It missed the mark 
because it focused its analysis on the correctness rather than the 
viability of the competing interpretations.106 Furthermore, part of the 
persuasive value of the dissent’s interpretation lies in its analysis of 
 
 103. Id. at 842–43. 
 104. See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 452–53 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 105. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844. 
 106. Judge Berzon suggests that the BIA’s interpretation in N-A-M- should not be given 
deference because the BIA believed its interpretation was compelled by Congress. Delgado v. 
Holder, 563 F.3d. 863, 883 (9th Cir. 2009) (Berzon, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) 
(citing Peter Pan Bus Lines, Inc. v. Fed. Motor Carrier Safety Admin., 471 F.3d 1350, 1354 
(D.C. Cir. 2006)). While the BIA did rest its decision upon “[a] plain reading of the Act,” its 
reliance on the legislative history, the agency’s “consistent practice,” and ultimately a policy 
determination that its interpretation was consistent with “the goal of protecting the public” 
reveals that it did not feel its decision was compelled by the text of the statute. See In re           
N-A-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 338, 341 (B.I.A. 2007). Yet even if the BIA mistakenly believed that 
its interpretation was compelled by the text, the appropriate response for the court would be to 
remand the proceedings for an agency reassessment of the ambiguous language as such, not for 
the court to impose its interpretation of the ambiguous language. See Peter Pan Bus Lines, 471 
F.3d at 1354. 
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the legislative history—an analysis that should only be used to verify 
a reasonable interpretation of the language if the statute is 
ambiguous, not to ascertain the correct interpretation. In contrast, 
the majority first acknowledged, though somewhat obliquely, that 
the statute is susceptible to two interpretations and then 
appropriately proceeded to address not the correctness of the BIA’s 
interpretation, but its reasonableness in light of traditional tools of 
statutory construction and the legislative history.107  
Given the BIA’s recent decision in N-A-M-, other circuits should 
reach the same result as Delgado if they properly apply the Chevron 
analysis when faced with the withholding issue. If reasonable 
susceptibility to competing interpretations is taken as the test for 
ambiguity, the practical implication is that Chevron deference will 
often be required whenever there is a genuine circuit split—a likely 
sign of ambiguity.108 Thus, if an agency were to interpret an 
ambiguous issue in the midst of a circuit split, it would potentially 
obviate the need for resolution by the Supreme Court. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit majority in Delgado perpetuates a 
misinterpretation of the asylum provisions of the INA by declaring 
that the Attorney General is free to designate by adjudication non-
aggravated felonies as particularly serious, despite the statute’s plain 
language granting authority only to make such designations by 
regulation in this matter. Regarding withholding of removal, 
however, the majority appropriately applied the Chevron doctrine in 
limiting its construction of the statute to a determination of its 
clarity and the reasonableness of the BIA’s interpretation. The 
dissent provides an example of a subtle, yet serious, misapplication of 
the Chevron doctrine by inappropriately using canons of construction 
and legislative history to determine the correct reading of the statute 
rather than determine whether the statute is susceptible to multiple 
interpretations. In so doing, it reaches a cursory—and mistaken—
conclusion as to the ambiguity of the statute and whether the BIA’s 
interpretation in N-A-M- should be accorded deference. In light of 
 
 107. Delgado, 563 F.3d at 867–68. 
 108.  It is possible, of course, that one or more courts of appeal could patently 
misinterpret a clear statute. 
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N-A-M-, therefore, a correct application of Chevron offers a chance 
to resolve the circuit split regarding the withholding exception. 
William M. Hains 
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